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Abstract
Although concerns about individual liberty and the nature and extent of repro-
ductive freedom have tended to dominate discussions regarding the proliferation
of and access to reproductive technologies, questions about the implications of as-
sisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) for equality have also arisen. Despite the
high number of invocations of equality in the literature regarding ARTs, to date
little effort has been made to comprehensively examine the implications of ARTs
for equality. This short Article seeks to highlight the variety of equality issues that
ARTs present and to develop a framework for classifying different types of equal-
ity issues. Specifically, I suggest that three different types of equality concerns
exist relevant to discussions about regulating ARTs: equality of access to ARTs
(and thus parenthood), equal treatment in the resolution of disputes arising from
the use of ARTs, and equality issues raised by trait-selection practices. My point
herein is neither to condemn nor to rationalize the inequalities that close examina-
tion may reveal. This Article instead issues a challenge to scholars in the field to
undertake a broader, more thorough consideration of the implications for equality
that the development of, and regulation or non-regulation of, ARTs present.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although concerns about individual liberty and the nature and extent of 
reproductive freedom have tended to dominate discussions regarding the 
proliferation of and access to reproductive technologies, questions about the 
implications of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) for equality have 
also arisen.  Indeed, someone attuned to listening for equality concerns 
realizes that these questions crop up quite frequently in discussions 
regarding assisted reproduction.
Moreover, the bases for potential inequality are quite diverse; in some 
instances the development of ARTs is touted as ameliorating existing 
inequalities, while in others it is suspected of exacerbating those 
inequalities.  For example, the website of a purveyor of egg-freezing 
services suggests that technology has the potential to equalize women’s 
position vis-à-vis men’s in the reproductive project—at least in part—by 
muffling the ticking of women’s so-called biological clock.1  By contrast, 
critics of surrogacy, or pregnancy contracts, in the 1980s and 1990s often 
warned that acceptance of the practice of surrogacy could worsen gender 
and social inequality by contributing to the development of a “breeder 
class” of poor women whose reproductive capacity would be coercively 
appropriated by wealthier couples seeking to acquire children.2  From yet 
another perspective, the development of ARTs has been described as 
creating an opportunity for the equal legal treatment of persons seeking to 
create a family, whether they do so simply by engaging in sexual 
intercourse or by the use of ARTs.3
*
   Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
1. The Extend Fertility website states: “As women, we lead rich and demanding lives. . . . 
Egg Freezing offers women planning to have children after the age of 35 the opportunity to 
effectively slow down their biological clocks.”  Extend Fertility, Why Freeze Eggs,  
http://www.extendfertility.com/why/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
2. See, e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 25 (1988).
3. See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS 
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Despite the high number of invocations of equality in the literature 
regarding ARTs, to date little effort has been made to comprehensively 
examine the implications of ARTs for equality.  While this short Article 
does not seek to accomplish such a comprehensive examination, it has the 
more modest aim of fostering future discussion.  The Article thus seeks to 
highlight the variety of equality issues that ARTs4 present and to develop a 
framework for classifying different types of equality issues.  Specifically, I 
suggest that three different types of equality concerns exist relevant to 
discussions about regulating ARTs: equality of access to ARTs (and thus 
parenthood), equal treatment in the resolution of disputes arising from the 
use of ARTs, and equality issues raised by trait-selection practices.  My 
point herein is neither to condemn nor to rationalize the inequalities that 
close examination may reveal.  This Article instead issues a challenge to 
scholars in the field to undertake a broader, more thorough consideration of 
the implications for equality that the development of, and regulation or non-
regulation of, ARTs present.
II. EQUALITY OF ACCESS TO ARTS
A variety of circumstances can function to impede or deny access to 
ARTs for some individuals seeking to have children.  Denials may result 
from providers’ decisions about whom they will serve, from legal rules 
establishing the availability of ARTs and the legal treatment of participants 
in ARTs, or from disparities in insurance coverage or financial wherewithal.  
An assortment of questions posed by inequalities in access to ARTs have 
already received some attention by scholars and policy makers.  Part II, 
however, seeks to highlight some of the issues raised by access inequalities.
A. Access Inequality Based on Participant Status
A number of personal characteristics may affect the likelihood that 
individuals seeking to use reproductive technologies will successfully find a 
medical provider willing to provide services to them.  Not surprisingly, 
some of these characteristics, such as sexual orientation or disability, are 
traits that may be likely to lead to social or economic disadvantage more 
L.J. 911, 913 (1996) (asserting that the “family project,” whatever the method of conception, 
“should be treated equally” in each case).
4. This Article uses the term “assisted reproductive technology” (ART) broadly to include 
not only those technologies that assist prospective parents in achieving pregnancy, but also those 
technologies that parents use to make decisions about whether to proceed with or terminate the 
reproductive project.  Thus, the final Part will consider the equality implications of trait-selection 
practices, which may or may not be used in conjunction with in vitro fertilization (IVF) or other 
methods of conception assistance.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art30
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generally.  Others, such as marital status or procreative capacity, by 
contrast, may produce inequality particular to the context of seeking 
technological assistance in reproducing.
A recent study suggests the role that provider screening may play in 
creating inequities in access to ARTs.5  Researchers surveyed fertility 
clinics in the United States to determine clinics’ beliefs about and practices 
for screening prospective patients and found substantial variation in the 
practices reported by clinics.6  A key value shared by most clinics, however, 
is the belief that ART programs have both the right and the responsibility to 
screen candidates in order to avoid assisting individuals who are deemed to 
be unfit as prospective parents to conceive a child.7  Reflecting this belief, a 
substantial proportion of reproductive technology programs reported that 
they would be likely to turn away hypothetical candidates with particular 
attributes.8  While the researchers acknowledged that it is unclear whether 
the clinics would actually turn away such candidates (particularly in light of 
the fact that many programs do not collect information regarding attributes 
they consider relevant),9 the results described below certainly suggest cause 
for concern regarding potential inequalities in access.
One basis on which substantial numbers of clinics reported a likelihood 
of turning away candidates was the candidate’s desire to parent singly.  
Many clinics indicated a reluctance to provide ART services to single 
persons, but this reluctance was imbalanced across gender lines.10  While 
20% of programs said that they would be very or extremely likely to turn 
away a woman without a husband or partner, 53% reached the same 
conclusion for a man who sought services without a wife or a partner.11
Thus, clinic personnel’s beliefs regarding the ability of individuals to parent 
singly may pose a real barrier to single persons seeking assistance in 
reproducing.
While many programs apparently believe that one parent is not enough, 
the presence of two individuals seeking ART services does not guarantee a 
judgment of parental suitability if the couple is gay or lesbian.  The 
percentage of clinics reporting an unwillingness to provide services to gay 
5. See generally Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61 (2005).
6. Id. at 65–66.
7. Id. at 64–65.
8. Id. at 65.
9. Id. at 65–66.
10. Id. at 65.
11. Id.
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or lesbian couples is nearly as high as the percentage unwilling to provide 
services to single parents, and it is similarly divided along gender lines.12
Reports of providers refusing to provide ART services to gays and lesbians 
are not uncommon,13 and they tend to confirm the existence of inequality 
between heterosexual couples and homosexual couples who seek medical 
assistance in bearing a child.
Another type of information relevant to clinics’ decisions to provide 
ART services is the prospective parent’s health or disability status.  This is 
particularly true with respect to women infected with human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) who seek ART services; more than half of 
the programs responding to the survey indicated that they would be unlikely 
to provide services to HIV-positive women.14  This finding is consistent 
with Professor Carl Coleman’s research, which suggests that refusals to 
provide ART services to individuals infected with HIV may constitute a 
form of disability discrimination.15  Coleman, however, also points to 
evidence that medical providers may screen out prospective patients based 
on other health conditions or disabilities.16  The recent study of ART 
programs provides further support for Coleman’s conclusions, finding that 
providers attached varying degrees of importance to conditions including a 
prospective mother’s severe diabetes (causing pregnancy to carry a 10% risk 
of maternal death), a prospective mother’s bipolar disorder, and “limited 
intellectual capacity” or blindness of both prospective parents.17
12. Forty-eight percent of the programs reported that they would be very or extremely likely 
to turn away a gay couple who sought to have a child through a surrogacy arrangement, with one of 
the men as the sperm source; seventeen percent indicated that they would be very or extremely 
likely to turn away a lesbian couple who sought to use donor insemination. Id. 
13. See, e.g., Peter Y. Hong, Lesbian Sues Over Physician’s Refusal to Do Insemination, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at B6.  At the same time, however, some providers of ART services 
have recognized gays’ and lesbians’ unmet demand for services and have chosen to cater to that 
market. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, Fatherhood by a New Formula, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2005, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A16533-2005Jan17?language=printer 
(describing a law firm that serves as a broker recruiting egg donors and surrogates for nontraditional 
parents).
14. Gurmankin et al., supra note 5, at 65.
15. Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving Harm: Disability Discrimination in Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 50 UCLA L. REV. 17, 31–43 (2002).
16. Id. at 29–31.
17. The respective percentages of programs reporting that they would be very or extremely 
likely to turn away candidates with specific conditions are as follows: severe maternal diabetes 
(55%), maternal bipolar disorder (13%), limited intellectual capacity of both members of the couple 
(15%), and blindness of both members of the couple (3%).  Gurmankin et al., supra note 5, at 65.  It 
is interesting that the survey specified that the blind prospective parents were blind from an 
accident, rather than congenitally blind.  Presumably this reflects an effort to focus the inquiry on 
perceptions of the fitness of prospective parents, rather than on eugenic concerns about the 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art30
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Although this recent study supports a conclusion that the patient 
screening practices of ART programs may produce some troubling 
inequalities among patients in access to ART services, provider screening is 
not alone in contributing to inequalities.  A number of laws and regulations 
may also impede access for individuals with particular characteristics.  For 
example, a recently implemented FDA rule advises sperm banks not to 
accept anonymous donations from men who have had sex with another man 
within the previous five years18 and thus may limit the ability of gay men to 
serve as donors for women or couples seeking to achieve a pregnancy.19
In contrast to the regulatory limits on gay sperm donors, other laws 
regulating access to ARTs do not tend to flatly prohibit the use of ARTs by 
specific groups.  Instead, they prevent some individuals from claiming legal 
protections relating to the parentage of children born as a result of the use of 
ARTs and from enforcing related contractual arrangements.  For example, 
the original version of the Uniform Parentage Act included a provision that 
established parentage for children born from donor insemination, but that 
provision applied only when a married woman received donor insemination 
with her husband’s consent.20  Thus, the law failed to resolve parentage 
issues for both single women who underwent donor insemination and their 
sperm donors.  Similarly, some state laws authorize the enforcement of 
surrogate parenting agreements only if the intended mother is infertile or 
otherwise unable to carry a pregnancy to term without undue risk.21  These
laws effectively deprive women who wish to enter into surrogacy 
arrangements for reasons other than infertility or pregnancy-related health 
risks of the ability to enter into legally enforceable agreements.
Of course, any favoring of infertile persons that results from laws 
limiting the enforceability of surrogacy contracts pales in comparison to the 
fundamental inequality between fertile persons and infertile persons. Such 
inequity flows from efforts, whether public or private, to limit access to 
ARTs based on the personal attributes of individuals seeking to employ 
transmission of genetic disability.
18. See FDA to Implement Guidelines Banning Men Who Have Sex with Men from Donating 
Sperm Because of Perceived HIV Risk, KAISER DAILY REPROD. HEALTH REP. May 6, 2005, 
available at http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=1&DR_ID=29881.
19. Id. The FDA’s rules, however, contain an exception that allows men who have had sex 
with men to make sperm donations to friends or family members. Id.
20. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973).
21. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2005) (authorizing binding and enforceable 
gestational surrogacy contract only when the commissioning mother cannot physically gestate a 
pregnancy to term or the gestation would cause a risk to the physical health of the commissioning 
mother or fetus); see generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, Uncovering the Rationale for Requiring 
Infertility in Surrogacy Arrangements, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 337 (2003).
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ART services to conceive a child.  Restrictions on access to ARTs create a 
double standard for becoming a parent.22  Those individuals who are able to 
conceive a child in the “usual and customary manner”23 are not subject to 
scrutiny regarding their fitness to parent, while those who are infertile24 may 
be blocked in their efforts to achieve parenthood by the fitness judgments of 
medical providers or policy makers.  While some fitness judgments may be 
widely accepted, others may tend to reflect suspect biases, and any 
imposition of such judgments may create a slippery slope.25
B. Access Inequality Based on Insurance Coverage and Finances
So far, this Article has focused on status inequalities in access to ART 
services: in other words, disparities in access based on personal 
characteristics of the individual seeking the services.  Because of the high 
monetary cost, however, financial constraints may also produce serious 
disparities in the ability to receive ART services.  A single cycle of in vitro 
fertilization typically costs approximately $10,000,26 and multiple cycles 
may be necessary to achieve a single pregnancy.  Because most private 
insurance policies do not provide coverage for ART services, patients 
typically must bear the costs of the services themselves.27  As a result, 
financial inequality in access to ARTs is likely to track financial inequality 
in society. Those with high incomes or significant assets allowing them to 
incur debt are able to finance services, while those with lower incomes and 
more meager assets are not.
Moreover, an argument can be made that insurers’ decisions to exclude 
coverage for ART services produce inequality.  If we understand ART 
22. See Gurmankin et al., supra note 5, at 62 (noting that a “dual standard for parenthood” 
exists).
23. See Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So.2d 1112, 1114  (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“Impregnation by the ‘usual and customary manner’ has been around long enough so that it does 
not constitute ‘reproductive technology.’”).
24. The term “infertile” refers to a larger group of persons than might be expected, since it 
does not necessarily connote an absolute inability to achieve pregnancy, but instead refers to a 
couple’s failure to conceive after a full year of engaging in sex without using contraception.  See 
Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical 
Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 612 (2003).  Thus, some “infertile” persons may conceive without 
any medical intervention.  I will argue below for an understanding of infertility that includes not 
only those medically unable to conceive, but also those socially unable to conceive.  See infra note 
29.
25. See Gurmankin et al., supra note 5, at 62.
26. See Noah, supra note 24, at 616.
27. Id.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art30
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services as a form of medical treatment, then it becomes apparent that 
infertile persons receive less complete coverage of their medical needs 
relating to reproductive health than do persons able to conceive without 
medical intervention.  In the context of sex discrimination law, courts have 
recognized that insurance providing less comprehensive coverage for the 
medical needs of one sex than it provides for the other’s constitutes a form 
of sex discrimination.28  Thus, exclusions of coverage for ARTs from 
otherwise comprehensive health insurance policies will have the effect of 
discriminating against persons who are infertile.
C. Issues in Responding to Access Inequality
When considering inequalities in accessing ARTs and the opportunities 
for parenthood that they allow, we can discern several dimensions of access 
inequality.  First, we may be concerned that—among persons who are 
unable29 to conceive through sexual intercourse—inequalities in access may 
be based on financial status, health or disability status, marital status, or 
sexual orientation.  Less obvious, but also disturbing, is the fact that 
screening practices by ART programs and exclusions of ART services from 
insurance coverage may function to relegate persons needing ARTs to an
inferior status as compared to persons able to procreate “naturally.”30
In the context of a symposium on the topic of regulating ARTs, we 
might begin to think about possible responses to inequalities that exist in 
access to ARTs.  One possible response seems fairly straightforward: we 
could seek to enact or change laws, regulations, or professional policies in 
ways that assure greater equality of access to ART services unless some 
sound reason exists to justify existing inequalities.  Of course, reaching 
agreement on what, if any, reasons might sufficiently excuse inequalities 
28. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 462 
U.S. 669 (1983) (finding, in the context of a sex discrimination in health insurance claim brought 
under Title VII, that the appropriate standard required assessment of the relative comprehensiveness 
of coverage provided to male and female employees).
29. In broad terms, individuals may be “unable” to conceive either as a result of a medical 
inability to conceive—what we typically think of as infertility—or as a product of “social 
infertility,” the inability to conceive through sexual intercourse.  Socially infertile persons would 
include gays and lesbians who seek to become parents, as well as single, unattached heterosexuals 
who wish to be parents.
30. I bracket the term “naturally” because I anticipate that a ready response to my point 
about relegating medically and socially infertile persons to an inferior status will be that any 
inequality experienced by those persons is somehow natural and not the product of social practices.  
Without dismissing such a response, I simply hasten here to caution that historical practices of race 
and sex discrimination were long justified as being based on biological and therefore “natural” 
differences.  We ought not simply accept, without careful scrutiny, “naturalness” justifications for 
inequality.
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will be a challenge.  Should we accept any restraints on access to ARTs?  If 
so, may restraints permissibly be based on the financial status of those 
seeking services?  On concerns about the future welfare of children who 
may result from the use of ARTs?  On the desire to accommodate the 
religious or moral beliefs of providers of ART services?
While it seems improbable that any satisfactory single, one-size-fits-all 
answer exists to these questions, it nonetheless seems desirable to try to 
reach some agreement on an approach that can be applied across contexts to 
different types of access inequality, rather than addressing access problems 
piecemeal.  Particularly with respect to denials of access based on personal 
attributes of those seeking services, it may be useful to think broadly about 
why any personal characteristics might disqualify one from relying on 
medical and technological assistance to achieve parenthood.
Admittedly, efforts to address particular status-based access problems 
have already been undertaken, with varying degrees of success.  In some 
instances where provider screening has led to denials of access, laws 
prohibiting discrimination based on a particular trait, such as disability or 
sexual orientation, have been brought to bear.31  Similarly, reform of the 
laws granting legal protections to participants in assisted reproduction could 
eliminate the inequalities those legal structures produce.  For example, the 
Uniform Parentage Act was revised in the year 2002 to make it clear that 
sperm donors would not be treated as the legal fathers of children resulting 
from donor insemination, regardless of the mother’s marital status.32
By contrast, one step in the direction of a broader approach to 
addressing status inequality can be seen in a recent statement by the Ethics 
Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”).33
While accepting the basic premise that fertility programs should be free to 
withhold services based on a belief that prospective parents present “serious 
child-rearing deficiencies,” the statement recognizes the risks of unjustified 
discrimination and unsubstantiated judgments of parental fitness.34  To 
31. Cf. Benitez v. N. Coast Women’s Care Med’l Group, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a lesbian’s state law antidiscrimination claim against physician for 
refusal to provide her with fertility services was not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA)); see generally Coleman, supra note 15 (discussing potential applicability of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)).
32. The Comment to Section 702 of the revised Uniform Parentage Act states that 
exempting sperm donors from legal paternity only when the recipient is a married woman “is not 
realistic in light of present ART practices and the constitutional protections of the procreative rights 
of unmarried as well as married women.”  See Uniform Parentage Act § 702 (2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm.
33. See The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Child-
Rearing Ability and the Provision of Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 564 (2004).
34. Id. at 565.
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minimize the risk of arbitrary, idiosyncratic, or illegal denials of services, 
the Ethics Committee recommends that ART programs should avoid ad hoc 
decisions and instead develop written policies and procedures calling for 
joint decision making by program providers.35  While we could debate 
whether the ASRM statement reflects a desirable balancing of the interests 
of infertile persons against medical providers’ autonomy and whether 
professional self-regulation is alone a sufficient response to access 
inequalities, the statement at least reflects an initial step towards provoking 
professional self-reflection regarding access inequalities.
Of course, changing providers’ screening practices will not mitigate the 
inequality that flows from excluding ART services from the coverage of 
private insurance policies.  Proposals to require insurers to include coverage 
of fertility services in policies have been made and, in about a dozen states, 
adopted.36  While such laws may effectively eliminate the discriminatory 
impact that the exclusions have on infertile persons, they may indirectly 
increase the chances of another form of inequality.  An argument frequently 
voiced against laws mandating that insurers cover particular benefits is that 
such laws raise the cost of health insurance and thereby price some 
employers and individuals out of the market for coverage.  If mandated 
benefits laws do contribute to an increase in the number of people who have 
no insurance (an empirical question on which I stake no claim), then they 
will exacerbate the already deeply disturbing inequality in our society that 
exists between persons with and without health insurance coverage.37  Thus, 
we begin to see how enhancing equality along one axis (equalizing the 
coverage that fertile and infertile persons receive for their reproductive 
health needs) may diminish equality along another (magnifying disparities 
in access to health care generally between persons with insurance and those 
without).  When confronting inequality tied to resource constraints, we must 
be particularly careful to avoid a “squeezing the balloon” effect.
III. UNBIASED TREATMENT IN RESOLVING DISPUTES RESULTING FROM THE 
USE OF ARTS
So far this Article has focused on inequities between individuals in 
their relative abilities to achieve access to ART services, and inequalities 
35. Id. at 567.
36. Cf. Noah, supra note 24, at 616–17.
37. On the other hand, some empirical evidence does indicate that providers transfer more 
embryos to patients in states that do not require insurance coverage.   See Noah, supra note 24, at 
626–27.  If so, mandating coverage may reduce the substantial costs associated with multifetal 
pregnancies and multiple births.  Moreover, decreasing the number of multiple births may lower the 
number of children with birth defects, thereby enhancing equality.
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between infertile and fertile individuals in their abilities to freely achieve 
parenthood.  In this Part, the focus shifts to scenarios that exist once ARTs 
have been used and something has gone awry.  Perhaps, for example, 
circumstances have changed for the prospective parents, as circumstances 
often do, or perhaps, more dramatically, a provider of ART services has 
made a mistake that leads to confusion of parentage.  When the use of ARTs 
leads to disputes between the participants in the process, the law is often 
deployed to resolve disputes or clarify relationships.  The extent to which 
the legal frameworks employed display biases presents another dimension 
of potential inequality worthy of exploration.
One type of dispute that has resulted in litigation arises when couples 
employ IVF to create embryos and the two intending parents disagree over 
whether to continue the reproductive process before an attempt at 
implantation occurs.  Courts called upon to resolve these “frozen embryo” 
disputes38 between the intended mother and intended father struggle with 
how to balance the competing interests at stake,39 and commentators have 
suggested how this struggle implicates equality concerns.
For example, an article written by Professor Judith Daar recognizes the 
potential for inequality between fertile and infertile women lurking in these 
cases and proposes an approach to resolving disputes regarding the 
disposition of frozen embryos that seeks to equalize the reproductive 
freedom of fertile and infertile women early in the pregnancy process.40
Daar argues that courts’ presumption in favor of the party seeking to avoid 
procreation may leave infertile women who have contributed to the creation 
of frozen embryos with less reproductive autonomy than their physically 
pregnant counterparts, who have sole authority to determine whether to 
continue the reproductive process.41  To avoid this inequality, Daar proposes 
38. Conceivably, the dispute will not always involve a frozen embryo, but could arise in the 
brief interval between the in vitro fertilization and transfer of the resulting embryos to the women. 
Cf. Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process: Developing an 
Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 455, 467 (1999) (suggesting 
such a scenario).
39. Some courts indicate that a balancing of interests need occur only if the intending 
parents have not previously entered into an agreement that would settle the dispute.  See Davis v. 
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)(balancing equitable 
interests when no agreement regarding disposition existed); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 
1998) (holding that preconception agreements between the parties contributing genetic material to 
the IVF process are presumptively enforceable); but see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 
2000) (refusing on public policy grounds to enforce a term in a fertility clinic’s consent form that 
would require a man to become a father against his will).
40. See Daar, supra note 38.
41. Id. at 457 (“A woman using ART should have the same right to control the fate of her 
unimplanted embryo as she would have to control her early fetus in a traditional pregnancy.  
Anything less would deny women undergoing ART equal protection of precious reproductive
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art30
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an approach that would give infertile women control over embryos for a 
limited period of time following conception.42
Daar’s article makes careful arguments and presents a thoughtful 
proposal about how to ensure equality of reproductive freedom for fertile 
and infertile women, but it is less attentive to an alternative inequality 
concern.  Gender equality provides a different lens for examining a point in 
the procreative process at which no physical pregnancy exists, so that issues 
of female bodily integrity and autonomy are less salient.43  One might argue 
that, rather than comparing women who have gone through the IVF process 
and created unimplanted embryos to women in the first trimester of a 
physical pregnancy and then proposing equal treatment of these two groups, 
one should instead compare these women to men who have gone through 
the same process.  Thus, one might argue that the egg contributor and sperm 
contributor are similarly situated prior to implantation and therefore should 
be treated equally, with neither being favored on the basis of gender, in any 
legal framework for resolving these disputes.  This approach essentially 
reflects a “sameness” approach to advancing gender equality,44 and is 
arguably consistent with a gender-neutral allocation of parental decision-
making rights regarding born children.45
By contrast, Professor Ruth Colker suggests an alternative approach, 
reflecting a “difference” model of gender equality, to dealing with frozen 
embryo disputes.46  Highlighting the greater stress and physical invasion 
endured by women in the IVF process and the reality that women have a 
limited supply of eggs and face declining fertility over time, Colker 
proposes that courts facing frozen embryo cases should presumptively 
award embryos to women who wish to implant them.  In this view, 
achieving an equitable result requires “recognizing the ways in which men 
and women are not similarly situated with respect to reproduction.”47
My point here is not to endorse one approach to resolving frozen 
liberties.”).
42. Id. at 467–69.
43. See Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm is Cheap, Eggs are Not, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1068 (1996) (stating: “When a case does not involve a pregnant person, then 
the rights protected by Roe are not implicated.”).
44. The “sameness” versus “difference” debate among feminists regarding the appropriate 
approach to advancing gender equality is described well in Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist 
Legal Theory, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 15–19 (2005).
45. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895–96 (1992) 
(distinguishing the nature of a father’s parental rights before and after birth).
46. See generally Colker, supra note 43.
47. Id. at 1066.
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embryo disputes over another; instead, it is to illustrate how the equality 
issues embedded in a particular type of ART-related dispute may be framed 
in multiple ways and come into tension.  Courts, policy makers, and 
commentators who are attentive to equality issues should think carefully 
about what weight to give to biological imbalances between men and 
women in the reproductive process, and whether gender-neutral or gender-
focused decision tools will best further equality.  For example, in the 
different context of resolving questions about the legal parentage of children 
already born through the use of ARTs, Professor Marjorie Shultz has argued 
that gender-neutral criteria are necessary to counterbalance men’s relative 
weakness in nurturing offspring in the reproductive process and thereby to 
reinforce men’s decisions to care for children.48  “By adopting a sex-neutral 
criterion such as intention, the law would partially offset the biological 
disadvantages men experience in accessing child-nurturing opportunities.”49
Nor is gender equality necessarily the preeminent challenge in crafting rules 
for establishing parentage following ART mistakes.  In her contribution to 
this Symposium and elsewhere, Professor Leslie Bender has demonstrated 
how courts’ analyses regarding parentage in cases where embryos have been 
misimplanted have been skewed by race-biased and sex-biased 
assumptions.50 Thus, when policymakers and judges are called upon to 
allocate decision-making authority or determine parentage in disputes that 
arise following the use of ARTs, they should be mindful of the variety of 
ways that the equality of the parties may be at stake.
IV. ISSUES OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY RAISED BY TRAIT SELECTION PRACTICES
The preceding Parts have suggested how equality issues may 
materialize when individuals seek technological assistance in 
reproduction—focusing first on participants’ access to ART services and 
then on how the law resolves disputes among participants arising from the 
provision of services.  This Part, by contrast, concentrates not on whether 
participants in the ART process are treated equally, but instead on the risk 
that using ARTs may contribute more broadly to material inequality in the 
conditions of persons’ lives.  This risk exists to the extent that the use of 
ARTs is coupled with parental selection of traits for the prospective child.  
Trait selection practices in current use raise the concern, but the equality 
48. See generally Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood:  An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297.
49. Id. at 303.
50. See generally Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies:  
ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race  &  Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2003).
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concerns may loom even larger when genetic enhancement technologies 
become a reality.
A. Trait Selection Practices Today
Several practices, including prenatal genetic screening, preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis, and sperm sorting, are available to prospective parents 
who seek to exercise some control over whether to bear a child with 
particular traits.  Among these, prenatal genetic screening coupled with 
abortion is, in theory, an option in any pregnancy, whether or not the 
pregnancy is achieved by use of ARTs.  By contrast, preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis is conducted following IVF and prior to implantation.  
These two trait selection methods simply allow parents to decide—once a 
particular trait of a fetus or embryo has been identified—whether to 
continue or terminate the reproductive process with respect to that fetus or 
embryo.  Sperm sorting techniques, on the other hand, seek to enable 
prospective parents to choose the sex of their offspring prior to conception 
and require the use of (at least) artificial insemination.51
Some have argued that trait selection practices in current usage may 
increase inequality in our society by allowing parents to select the sex of 
their offspring or to select against disability in their offspring.  For example, 
Adrienne Asch, one of the most prominent and thoughtful voices 
articulating the disability rights critique of prenatal genetic testing, 
expresses concern about the message that prenatal screening and selective 
abortion send regarding the dignity and worth of persons with the selected-
against disabilities, and the resulting devaluation of persons with disabilities 
in our society.52  She argues: “[R]esearchers, professionals, and 
policymakers, who uncritically endorse testing followed by abortion, act 
from misinformation about disability, and express views that worsen the 
situation for all people who live with disabilities now or in the future.”53 The 
concern exists because of the relative speed with which prenatal testing 
practices have proliferated in our society and the accompanying lack of 
careful thought regarding its implications for social equality.
Sex selection practices by prospective parents raise similar concerns 
51. See Kelly M. Plummer, Comment, Ending Parents’ Unlimited Power to Choose: 
Legislation Is Necessary to Prohibit Parents’ Selection of Their Children’s Sex and Characteristics, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 517, 520–22 (2003).
52. See Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or 
Compatible?,  30  FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (2003).  For a volume addressing this concern from a 
variety of perspectives, see PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS (Erik Parens & Adrienne 
Asch eds., 2000).
53. Asch, supra note 52, at 316–17.
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regarding gender equality.  These concerns are relatively muted in the 
United States today, where reliable sex selection techniques remain fairly 
uncommon and appear to be employed primarily for purposes of “family 
balancing” (i.e., seeking the presence of both female and male children in a 
family).54  In other societies, such as India and China, where a much greater 
cultural emphasis is placed on bearing male heirs, sex selection techniques 
result in the aborting of many thousands—perhaps millions—of female 
fetuses each year.55  In these contexts, sex selection techniques raise stark 
concerns about the material inequality of women in a patriarchal society.56
While epidemic abortions of female fetuses in some societies raise 
obvious gender equality concerns, they also produce tension among 
advocates of greater gender equality as to the best strategy for addressing 
the inequality of women.  While many Western feminists assert that 
maintaining reproductive choice (and hence the option of sex selective 
abortions) is of central concern for women’s social equality, feminists in 
India have decried selective abortion of female fetuses and have 
successfully lobbied for legal prohibitions on what they consider further 
oppression of women.57  Thus, even those sharing concerns about the 
ramifications of trait selection practices for the social equality of persons 
bearing the traits commonly selected against may have difficulty agreeing 
on how best to alleviate that inequality.
B. Trait Selection Practices on the Horizon
Today, prospective parents are fairly limited in the choices they can 
make to select the traits of their offspring.  They can seek to identify certain 
genetic traits either of a fetus during pregnancy or of an unimplanted 
embryo following IVF and then choose whether to continue the 
reproductive process with respect to that fetus or embryo.  In other words, 
the stance of prospective parents today is largely reactive58 to information 
54. See Rob Stein, A Boy for You, A Girl for Me: Technology Allows Choice, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 14, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62067-
2004Dec13.html.
55. See generally Gautam N. Allahbadia, The 50 Million Missing Women, 19 J. ASSISTED 
REPROD. & GENETICS 411 (2002).
56. See Farhat Moazam, Feminist Discourse on Sex Screening and Selective Abortion of 
Female Foetuses, 18 BIOETHICS 205, 206 (2004); see also Uma Girish, For India’s Daughters, A 
Dark Birth Day, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0209/p11s01-wosc.html.
57. See Moazam, supra note 56, at 206.
58. Sperm sorting, by contrast, presents an opportunity for prospective parents to influence, 
rather than simply react to, a trait of their desired offspring.  See id.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art30
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about a limited set of traits.  As scientists proceed to identify the function of 
an ever greater number of genes, however, it is likely that parents in the near 
future will have access to information about far more genetic traits.  More 
fundamentally, the predicted (but less imminent) development of gene 
therapy technologies that would permit correction of disease- or disability-
causing genes and enhancement of other genetic characteristics, such as 
intelligence, athleticism, or behavioral traits, may permit prospective 
parents to manipulate the genetic makeup of their offspring.  The 
availability of such technologies, particularly enhancement technologies, 
will pose both risks and opportunities for social equality.
We cannot today predict with confidence whether a future capacity to 
enhance genetic characteristics will lead to a more or less equal society, but 
a small cottage industry of scholars and commentators has already been 
busy exploring the various potential ramifications of genetic interventions, 
among them the implications for equality and justice in society.59  While this 
Article does not seek to recount the extensive discussions of the distributive 
justice implications of genetic treatment and enhancement, even a cursory 
review of the literature reveals significant disagreements.  Some scholars 
suggest the possibility that genetic interventions may be used to improve the 
functioning and lot of those who would otherwise find themselves at the 
bottom of the social and economic ladder.60  In this view, trait selection by 
genetic enhancement or treatment technologies61 may lead to a more just 
society by, in Rawlsian terms, improving the position of those least well off.
Also voiced, however, is a less sanguine view highlighting our 
society’s current inability to ensure equitable access to existing health care 
technologies and predicting that genetic interventions—once developed—
will be financially accessible only to those individuals who are already the 
most well off.62  To wit, rather than ameliorating existing social inequalities, 
59. For a thought-provoking and influential book-length discussion of these issues by a 
group of leading bioethicists, see ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS 
AND JUSTICE (2000). For a sampling from the burgeoning literature on this question, see Michael H. 
Shapiro, Does Technological Enhancement of Human Traits Threaten Human Equality and 
Democracy?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 769 (2002); Mark A. Hall, Genetic Enhancement, Distributive 
Justice, and the Goals of Medicine, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 669 (2002); Arti K. Rai, Genetic 
Interventions: (Yet) Another Challenge to Allocating Health Care, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 657 
(2002); Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999); 
Kean Birch, Beneficence, Determinism and Justice: An Engagement with the Argument for the 
Genetic Selection of Intelligence¸ 19 BIOETHICS 12 (2005).
60. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 59, at 813 (pointing out the potential of technological 
enhancement “to even out nature’s hierarchial roughness”).
61. Debate also exists with respect to whether there exists a meaningful moral distinction 
between “treatment” and “enhancement.”  See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 104–56.
62. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 59, at 809 (suggesting that distributing enhancement 
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genetic intervention technologies will have the effect of exacerbating those 
inequalities and contributing to a less just society.  In this view, society 
faces the prospect that the extant financial disparities in access to ARTs 
discussed in Part II will simply be replicated with respect to the allocation 
of gene therapy services, with an intensified effect when genetic alterations 
are at issue.  If the problem is financial disparities in access to trait selection 
services, then an equality-enhancing cure is less than clear.  The alternative 
of providing funding to ensure equality of access regardless of wealth seems 
sadly laughable in light of our society’s current unwillingness to provide 
equality of access to even basic health care services.  And the alternative of 
regulating or limiting the availability of trait selection services in order to 
avoid the material inequality that may flow from their free availability on 
the market may act to limit the exercise of individual liberties, and perhaps 
produce inequalities of access along other axes.
Certainly, this sketching of views regarding the possible equality and 
justice implications of future trait selection practices does not begin to 
plumb the depth of the issues that genetic intervention technologies will 
pose.  However, it suggests yet another dimension of the equality issues that 
ARTs are likely to pose in the near future.  Questions about ramifications of 
trait selection technologies for social equality must be raised and addressed 
carefully while we are still scanning the horizon.
V. CONCLUSION
A central purpose of this Article has to been to propose a framework 
for thinking about the various ways in which the development and 
proliferation of ARTs may raise issues of inequality, whether they be 
questions of material and social inequality or questions of unequal treatment 
at the hands of the state or private actors.  Developing this framework, 
however, also serves to highlight the potential for tensions between various 
dimensions of equality.  For example, efforts to expand and equalize the 
exercise of individual liberties may be at odds with attempts to address 
social inequality and avoid its exacerbation by regulating or otherwise 
decreasing trait selection practices.  Similarly, as the discussion of the 
frozen embryo cases demonstrates, the possibility exists that the equality 
issue raised in a particular context may be characterized in competing terms.
While precluding neat answers to the equality questions that ARTs 
raise, recognition of these tensions presents the opportunity for scholars and 
policy makers in this field to think carefully about whether any proposed 
regulation of ARTs might accommodate competing equality concerns or 
characterizations of equality.  If competing equality concerns cannot be 
resources via market mechanisms would increase socioeconomic inequality).
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accommodated, the challenge becomes to assess which aspect of equality it 
is most important to advance in the particular setting.  In sum, my hope is 
that this brief examination will stimulate scholars, policy makers, and 
service providers in this field to adopt a wide-angle view of the many 
dimensions of equality at play in the provision and regulation of ARTs.
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